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Hagberg: Officers--Disqualifications for Office--Conviction of Felony
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
has seldom been applied to injuries sustained on public streets or
highways. Compensation is denied in this situation on the theory
that the risk or hazard is not increased as a result of the employment - the general public bearing the same risk - and because
the employee is free from the employer's control." West Virginia
permits recovery in this situation on the theory that the act is a
necessary one and thus incidental to the employment."
This,
however, is true of the physical acts of agents, and yet, in the
situation under consideration, it is well settled that the principal
is not responsible.' Indeed, the result of the instant case appears
desirable, for special liability under the statute must cease at some
point and the point fixed by this case is a predictable one.
It
affords the employee protection qua employee; it does not impose
upon the employer an unusual responsibility based upon a relationship which has ceased.
-EDWARD
S. BOaK, JR.
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FnmoNy. - The relator was duly elected to the office of constable.
By a writ of mandamus he seeks to compel the county court of
Raleigh County to permit him to qualify for office. He had previously been convicted of two felonies and had served his terms
he had finished his day's work and while he was walking along the tracks
on the railroad premises where according to the known custom he intended
to catch a train on which he and other of the employees were allowed to
ride home.); Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 176 U. S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221
(1928); In re Sundine, 218 Mass. 216, 105 X. E. 433 (1914); Starr Piano
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. 433, 184 Pac. 860 (1919);
Piocaccino v. Horton and Son, 95 Conn. 408, 111 Atl. 594 (1920).
' State ex rel Gallet v. Clearwater Timber Co., 47 Idaho 295, 274 Pac.
802 (1929) (Employee driving his own automobile was fatally injured at a
public crossing of a railroad. Recovery denied.); N. K. Fairbank Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 285 fI1. 11, 120 N. E. 457 (1918); Paulauskis' Case,
126 Me. 32, 135 Atl. 824 (1927); Reed v. Bliss and V. A. Lumber Co., 225
Mich. 164, 196 N. W. 420 (1923); Harris v. Henry Cheney Hammer Co., 221
App. Div. 199, 223 N. Y. Supp. 738 (1927); Dellepiani v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 211 Cal. 430, 295 Pac. 826 (1931); contra: Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 44 S. Ct. 153 (1923).
'-'State ex rel. Gallet v. Clearwater Timber Co., and cases cited, supra n. 11.
"Judge Hatcher's dissent in Canoy v. State Compensation Commissioner,
170 S. E. 181 (W. Va. 1933).
" Canoy v. State Compensation Commissioner, supra n. 13; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra n. 11; Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala.
462, 143 So. 813 (1932); Kent v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., supra n. 6.
'Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 10 S. Ct. 175 (1889)
(A master is liable to third persons injured by an act of his servant which
is incidental to the employment.).
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in the penitentiary. The county court alleges that the relator is
thus disqualified by the statute which provides that "No person
convicted of .... felony shall, while such conviction remains unreversed, be elected ....to any office." Held: Relator was entitled
to post bond, take oath, and qualify for office. Webb v. County
Court of Raleigh County.'
A general policy prohibiting persons who have been convicted
of felony or infamous crime, from holding offices of public trust
and confidence has been expressed in many constitutions and
statutes.'
The West Virginia provisions while differing in
phraseology do not appear different in purpose. This purpose,
as announced by a majority of courts, is to insure, as far as possible, public confidence in the integrity of public officers - for it
was "never intended that a public office should be contaminated
by the presence of a convicted felon".' Thus the statutes make
conviction necessary to disqualification." But the conviction must
be of a crime committed within the state unless the statute
specifically provides otherwise,' in which case, a conviction in a
sister state, in the federal courts, or even in a foreign country
1168 S. E. 760 (W. Va. 1933).
'W. Va. Const., art. 6, § 14, "No person who has been, or hereafter shall
be convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crimes, shall be eligible
to a seat in the Legislature." Wis. Const., art. X=II, § 3.-''No person convicted of an infamous crime in any court within the United States ....
shall be eligible to any office of trust, profit or honor in this state." Accord:
Va. Const., § 32; Miss. Const., § 241; Ind. Const., art. I, § 6; Penn. Const.,
art. IX, § 3.
3W. VA. REv. CoD
(1931) c. 6, art. 5, § 5. "No person convicted of treason, felony, or bribery in any election, before any court in or out of this
State, shall, while such conviction remains unreversed, be elected or appointed
to any office under the laws of this State; and, if any person, while holding
such office, be so convicted, the office shall be thereby vacated."
Accord:
VA. GEN. LAws (1923) §§ 4495, 4497; Onio Gm. CoDE (1932) §§ 12390,
12391; MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 279, § 30; Ixn. Amx. STAT. (Burns,
1926) §§ 7610, 11607; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 38, § 587;
FLA. ComP. LAWS (1927) § 458.
4Comm. v. Fugate, 2 Leigh 724 (Va. 1830); State v. Levi, 109 W. Va.
277, 153 S. E. 587 (1930); In re Advisory Opinion, 31 Fla. 1, 12 So. 114,
18 L. R. A. 594 (1893); McKinney v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711, 91 Pac. 598
(1907).
'In re Advisory Opinion, supra n. 4; Gray v. Seitz, 162 Ind. 1, 69 N. E.

456 (1904).

'Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617 (1892). 1'
At common law and on general principles of jurisprudence, when not controlled by
express statute giving effect within the state which enacts in to a conviction
and sentence in another state, such convictions and sentences can have no
effect, by way of penalty or of personal disabilities or disqualification beyond
the limits of the state in which judgment is rendered."1 Accord: State v.
McDonald, 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508 (1933); Cf. State v. Du Bose, 88 Tenn.
753, 13 S.W. 1088 (1890).
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will disqualify." The apparent policy of the Webb case,8 however,
is that the serving of sentence obliterates the offense. When a
criminal serves his sentence and returns to society he must be
given the widest opportunity for vocational readjustment. This
policy is, perhaps, justified by the great increase in statutory
felonies embracing many acts which would have been only misdemeanors at common law and would not have disqualified the
actor from holding office. This, however, is argument for the
change of our legislative policy rather than for a new judicial
interpretation of the word "reversed"!
To enforce this policy
as the court has done by saying that a prisoner has "reversed"
his conviction by serving his sentence only increases our already
burdensome load of legal subtleties. In judicial usage "reversed"
means the setting aside, annulling, or vacating an order or judgment." Strictly, it may even be doubted whether a pardon will
remove the disqualification created by a conviction.'
In short,
unless the legislature only meant that a person convicted of a
felony should not hold public office while in the penitentiary, the
interpretation placed upon the statute by the Webb case is
spurious.'
-R.
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WRIT. - In a recent case, A sued B
before a magistrate for money paid for a tract of land. B filed
a statutory affidavit stating that the title to the land would come
into question, which would deprive the magistrate of further
jurisdiction if not met by a sufficient counter affidavit. In his
affidavit, B failed to disclose that to his knowledge the title to
the land had been adjudicated in a former equity suit. A filed
an insufficient counter affidavit, and the justice, after hearing
DENIAL OF TE

"Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 X. E. 360 (1923).

Writ of error

OSee, Horack, In the Name of Legis&7atve Intention (1932)

38 W. VA. L.

dismissed, 267 U. S. 575, 45 S. Ct. 230 (1924).
8
,S'uina n. 1.

Q.119.
0

2 WORDS AN PHRASES, p. 6211.
uMorgan v. Vance, 4 Bush. 323 (Ky. 1868). Of. Donham v. Gross, 210
Cal. 190, 290 Pac. 884 (1930).
2Pound, Spurious Interpretation (1907) 7 CoL. L. REV. 379, 381; Radin,
Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rav. 863; Landis, A Note on
Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 HARv. L. Ra. 886.
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